establishing an agreed international classification of mental disorders. This had been tried before but had failed. It was part of the consultant's task to examine the reasons for that failure. The speaker was invited to undertake this study. No attempt was made to carry out a complete survey. The aim was to investigate present trends in psychiatric classification used for clinical, statistical and research purposes. In some countries no registration of psychiatric morbidity had, at the time of the enquiry, been carried out, while in others it was done very thoroughly. In several countries special committees concerned with classification and aiming at establishing uniformity within their national boundaries were at work. 58 classifications were collected. They were divided into two groups: (1) Those which had been used or recommended for use by public health authorities or learned societies, i.e. the official, semi-official or national classifications.
(2) Those used only regionally or locally.
FEBRUARY
The International Statistical Classification of Diseases, Injuries and Causes of Death (I.C.D.) issued by WHO was recommended for use by all member states. However, the part relevant to psychiatry, Section V, failed to find general acceptance and was adopted only in Finland, New Zealand, Peru, Thailand and in this country. It differs from all other classifications by not presenting all mental disorders together. Some are listed in the context of other sections. For instance, puerperal psychosis is listed among the complications of the puerperium, general paralysis under syphilis, &c.
The American Psychiatric Association developed a classification of their own, the so-called A.P. A. Standard Classification (1952) . Part of the nomenclature used in this classification was new. However, it cannot have had an easy passage either, because it has so far failed to be adopted by the State of New York which, from the point of view of psychiatric statistics, is the most important state of the Union. Unlike Section V of the I.C.D., the Standard Classification covers all psychiatric conditicns. The users of this classification are greatly assisted by the "Diagnostic and Statistical Manual" issued by the American Psychiatric Association. This Manual contains a glossary of psychiatric terms. Thus the A.P.A. classification is better documented than any other. Its adoption by some other countries of the Western Hemisphere has been under consideration for some time. The American Standard Classification uses aetiology as the guiding criterion. Psychogenic etiological factors are accorded equal status with organic causes. The first section includes all psychiatric disorders in which an impairment of brain function can be assumed, however transient and of whatever origin. Although the involvement of the brain may be trivial and quite accidental to the main physical illness, it qualifies for inclusion into this section of "brain syndromes" which comprises all organic psychiatric conditions ranging from a state of slight alcohol intoxication to Alzheimer's disease and amaurotic idiocy. The logical advantages of this arrangement are obvious, though it resulted in the breaking up of traditional clinical groups of mental disorders. There was little left of mental deficiency outside the section of brain disorders, and of the psychoses only the schizophrenic and manicdepressive reaction types remained as a separate group. The section concerning psychotic disorders on the whole follows the conventional pattern. The term involutional depression was replaced by "involutional psychotic reaction". There is a so-called psychotic depressive reaction which is not referred to in the I.C.D. The section entitled "psycho-physiological autonomic and visceral disorders" contains many neurotic states with physical symptoms. The term hysteria was abandoned. The most controversial section is that concerning personality disorders which are divided into four subsections-personality pattern disturbance (e.g. schizoid personality); personality trait disturbance such as compulsive or aggressive personality; sociopathic personality disturbance including the antisocial, the perverts and the addicts; and, fourthly, a miscellaneous group containing special disabilities such as speech disturbance, &c. The glossary is helpful but sometimes ambiguous. It does not, for instance, give clear guidance about the classification of paranoid psychoses.
The Canadian Classification is a shortened version of the I.C.D. The number of categories of the psychiatric section of the I.C.D. has been reduced by 4. The French Standard Classification follows on the whole the classification of Kraepelin, with an even stronger emphasis on clinical symptomatology. In Germany a variety of classifications are in -use. The older ones have no independent section for the neuroses which are included in the two categories of psychopathic personalities and abnormal reactions. However, in the more recent classifications the neuroses again figure as independent categories. Japan has, in matters psychiatric, remained under German influence. The classifications in use in the Scandinavian countries are. of particular interest as Scandinavian psychiatrists have given the problem of classification and diagnosis a great deal of thought. Their orientation is frankly symptomatological. A special feature is the emphasis on psychogenic psychoses and behaviour disorders. In Switzerland and Portugal a shortened version of the French Standard Classification is used. The classifications used in the Soviet Union are based on classical European nosology to which Pavlovian concepts are applied. It is noteworthy that anxiety neurosis does not figure among their clinical categories. In the concept of psychogenesis of the Russian authors, "traumatism" rather than conflict is assumed to be the pathogenic factor. Hereditary factors are accorded relatively little importance. The basic approach is neurological and neurophysiological.
Among the seventeen sections of the I.C.D., Section V is the only one which has been almost generally rejected. The speaker made it his task to investigate why it met with such a poor reception. He also tried to find out how it had been working where it had been in use. A great variety of critical comments were received from organizations and individual psychiatrists. One of the most common complaints was lack of comprehensiveness. Psychiatrists resented having to go outside Section V to classify common psychiatric conditions. Scandinavian colleagues criticized the absence of the category of psychogenic psychoses and of other concepts they regarded as important. Others found it unwieldy and too complicated. Henry Ey called it incoherent and inconsistent with regard to basic principles. In his view, most classifications in current use were mere enumerations and nomenclatures. It must be admitted that Section V of the I.C.D. has many irritating features. It is headed "Mental, Psychoneurotic and Personality Disorders". "Mental" in this context means psychotic, surely a blatant terminological anachronism. Some categories are too inclusive and lack subclassifications. The subclasses of the categories of personality disorders have been criticized for not being mutually exclusive. Child psychiatrists have felt that Section V of the I.C.D. served their requirements very inadequately. Section V of the I.C.D. has been used in this country since 1948. This provided an opportunity for obtaining the views of some of those who worked with this system and also for examining its potential usefulness for the research worker. The data obtained with the help of this classification show many bewildering discrepancies. For instance, in 1949 the diagnosis of paranoid psychosis was made in the Manchester Region only 14 times among 3,212 admissions, while in other regions with approximately the same number of admissions, it was made 74, 82, 100 and 125 times respectively. There were similar discrepancies in other categories and some were very little used. Obviously, the I.C.D. had failed in its purpose of recording relevant data reliably. There were at least two reasons for this: first, the system had been only partly accepted by those who had to provide the data, and secondly, there was insufficient agreement about the meaning and scope of the categories. Unfortunately, the recommendation of the 1950 WHO Expert Committee on Mental Health, that a glossary of descriptive definitions of Section V should be compiled, has never been implemented. The 1955 Revision brought some slight modifications in the categories concerning mental deficiency only. It became clear from the enquiries that the existing I.C.D. had no prospects of being generally accepted in its present form as far as psychiatry was concerned. The same applies, for other reasons, to the American Standard Classification.
Principles of classification.-A classification divides a given set or class of objects into subclasses which should be mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive. In medicine there has been a gradual development from a symptomatological to an vetiological emphasis. In psychiatry, the application of the principles underlying classification meets with difficulties, owing to the lack of objectively verifiable concepts. The material the psychiatrist has to classify consists neither of disease entities in the strict sense, nor of people, but of a variety of disorders or reactions some of which are not mutually exclusive. There is much to be said in favour of operational definitions in psychiatry, i.e. definitions based on agreed criteria and used for specific purposes such as classification. In fact, many of the present nosological concepts are no more than operational definitions. Schizophrenia, then, as an operational concept, would not be an illness, i.e. a biological reality with which it would be wrong to tamper, but an agreed operational definition for certain types of abnormal behaviour. The same applies to such concepts as psychopathy, &c. From the point of view of classification, therefore, the question would not be what schizophrenia or psychopathy are, but in what meaning those concepts should be used for the purpose of diagnosis and classification, i.e. for the purpose of communication. Those who find it difficult to accept this frankly utilitarian attitude to psychiatric classification can be referred to Kraepelin's comments to the last version of his classification; "I want to emphasize that some of the clinical pictures outlined are no more than attempts at presenting part of the material observed in a communicable form".
What have been the criteria, or principles, or dimensions, or axes underlying psychiatric classifications? Kraepelin's orientation has been described as one of empirical dualism. He combined cerebral pathology with psychopathology. His broad division of mental disorders into organic, probably organic and/or constitutional, and psychogenic, is still a basic feature of most classifications to-day. It did not occur to Kraepelin that psychogenic wetiology disqualified from membership of the class of mental disorders. This is the characteristic feature of Kurt Schneider's broad division of the material. To that author the concept of illness applies only where organic changes exist or can be postulated with confidence. Other mental disorders are only abnormal varieties of sane mental life. According to Schneider, there are no neuroses but only neurotics. The concept of neurosis as a psychopathic reaction had a considerable influence on psychiatric theory and practice in Germany.
Adolf Meyer's classification followed from his concept of mental disorder which was fundamentally psychopathological. Kleist's system is consistently etiological. The schizophrenias are classified with the cerebral degenerative diseases; the neuroses are cerebral dysfunctions, with psychogenic factors playing only a secondary role. Leonhard's classification of the endogenous psychoses follows the same line. Henry Ey's classification is fundamentally psychopathological, with a psychophysiological bias and an existentialist philosophy. He views mental disorders as manifestations of disturbances of two variables, the level of consciousness and the functioning of the personality. The first group, disturbances of consciousness, includes all acute psychoses including manic-depressive attacks, while the rest forms the second group. The scheme is very clear and logical, but some of it is at variance with clinical realities. There is no representative psychoanalytical classification, though Menninger has revived the old unitary concept of mental illness. To him the various mental disorders differ only by the degree of regression of mental functions. In many classifications, consistency is maintained by the postulation of a certain type of wtiology, e.g. of an organic cause for schizophrenia. The kind of wetiology implied in these classifications is that of a single causality which is by many regarded as inapplicable in psychiatry.
There are considerable differences in the classification of paranoid reactions. Only a minority of the classifications have the category of involutional depression. It is needless to say that the discrepancies are most serious in the categories of the neuroses and personality disorders.
Differences of opinion about the relative weight of etiological factors singled out as criteria for definition are responsible for a number of divergencies. The question whether psychogenic psychoses should be given the status of an independent category is a case in point. Such a category is likely to be opposed by the organicist, who would accord psychogenic factors only a minor role in the &etiology of the psychoses, as well as by the psychodynamically oriented psychiatrist. The latter would argue that such a category implies the absence of psychogenic factors in the etiology of the psychoses not termed psychogenic. Similar differences of basic concepts enter into the question of the relationship between the neuroses and the psychopathies. A small number of classifications attempt to classify along two axes, i.e. the clinical and the aetiological, at the same time.
It may well be asked whether, in view of the existing difficulties and the failure of the I.C.D. to find general acceptance in psychiatry, any other classification would have prospects of success at the present time. In answer to this question, it can be stated that there has never been as strong a demand for an international classification of mental disorders as there is to-day. However, it still remains to be proved that psychiatrists are willing to adopt such a classification at the price of some inconvenience and concessions.
Those concerned with devising an international psychiatric statistical classification will have to make up their minds about two problems: (1) Is it essential for an international psychiatric classification to be preceded by, or even be the outcome of a generally accepted international psychiatric nomenclature? (2) Is it essential for such a classification to be preceded by an agreement on basic diagnostic concepts?
Desirable though the adoption of a common nomenclature might appear, such an agreement is not an essential prerequisite for a practicable and generally acceptable classification. Probably considerations concerning nomenclature have in the past interfered unduly with the requirements of classification. The difference between a statistical classification and a nomenclature tends to be overlooked. A nomenclature, 4 being a list of approved terms for describing and recording observations, has to be extensive and unlimited in scope and detail to allow for the faithful recording of the manifold individual variations of ill-health. A statistical classification, on the other hand, is concerned with groups of conditions whose peculiarities have to be fitted within a limited number of categories chosen for their usefulness for the numerical study of disorders. The functions of a nomenclature and of a statistical classification are, therefore, in some respects opposed to each other. It is even conceivable that a statistical classification would dispense with nosological terms altogether and use numerical or other symbols. However, there is no need for such a device. There exists sufficient agreement on basic terminology for a generally acceptable classification of mental disorders to be drawn up. Possibly such an agreement may prepare the ground for a common nomenclature. But the latter would be a much more ambitious and complex undertaking than a classification which would have to be a relatively simple instrument of communication. It may even be argued that a generally adopted detailed psychiatric nomenclature may at the present time have an inhibiting effect on psychiatric thought.
The second question concerns agreement on diagnostic concepts. The view has often been expressed that the lack of such an agreement is bound to defeat the purpose of any national or international classification. Comparability of diagnostic data presents a serious problem in psychiatry. The reliability of diagnosis has been found to be very low in many areas of psychiatric morbidity. Some investigators, however, have found a surprisingly high reliability, especially where psychiatrists shared a similar orientation. Psychiatrists have for some time paid too little attention to their diagnostic concepts which often differ considerably, even among members of the same institute, without their being aware of it. If, for instance, some psychiatrists regard recovery as incompatible with the diagnosis of schizophrenia and others do not hold this view, and if they have failed to make it clear to each other that their diagnostic concepts differ fundamentally, how can they be expected to agree? But apart from these difficulties, which could be considerably reduced, the reliability of psychiatric diagnosis will remain limited in those categories where no objective criteria can be employed. However, these difficulties can be overstated. The adoption of operational definitions should go some way towards reducing disagreements on diagnosis. I believe that no explicit agreement on diagnostic concepts is necessary, provided that the existence of different concepts is recognized and guarded against, and provided that operational definitions are adopted for the purpose of classification. A statistical classification of mental disorders, to be acceptable internationally, will have to avoid the impression that it aims at influencing psychiatrists all over the world along certain lines which many of them may not wish to follow. The requirement of neutrality in the controversies between various schools of thought imposes considerable limitations on an international classification. It has to be based on points of established agreement. This is why it cannot be ahead of its time. It can at present be no more than a tool of communication for a limited range of data such as the incidence and prevalence of certain mental disorders. There is no reason why an international psychiatric classification should not coexist with regional or local classifications, many of which have valuable functions in research and administration. Such classifications may stimulate the study into new relationships and thus advance knowledge. The only proviso would be their easy convertibility into the international system. That this is practicable has already been proved. A glossary with operational definitions of the various categories would have to be available from the beginning.
It has often been said that a classification has above all to be consistent with regard to the criteria of differentiation. Such a demand is unreasonable at the present state of psychiatry. No psychiatric classification can help reflecting the patchiness of our knowledge. It will have to be partly etiological and partly symptomatological, because these are the criteria by which psychiatrists distinguish mental disorders from each other. No classification can meet every criticism, but even the best cannot serve its function unless all those participating in its application know it and want to make it work. It is essential that the psychiatrists supplying the diagnostic data should be familiar with the statistical classification in use and with its purpose. This is the exception rather than the rule to-day. Many psychiatrists seem unaware that their diagnoses are more than private observations concerning only themselves and their patients.
One of the recurrent criticisms of the I.C.D. and similar classifications has been the lack of provision for the recording of diagnostic formu-lations. The same difficulties exist in other fields of morbidity and it is doubtful whether a statistical classification which could serve this purpose can be designed at present. The I.C.D. provides for related and unrelated additional diagnoses. Classifications which allow for the recording of two or more dimensions have been recommended, but no information about the use of such systems has so far been available. Those concerned with the revision of the I.C.D. will be well advised to make Section V comprehensive. Theoretical objections against such a change are far outweighed by the practical disadvantages of the present arrangement. The question how agreement on a drastic revision of Section V could be reached, is under active consideration. It will be necessary for suitable proposals to be submitted in good time before the next Revision Conference in 1962. It may be advantageous if pilot studies with alternative classifications thought to be suitable for international use were undertaken before final recommendations were made. Agreement will be reached if the advantages of an international psychiatric classification are generally recognized, if it is realized that a classification is not the embodiment of scientific truth but a code for practical use, and if it is understood that such a code can perfectly well coexist with other systems of classifications serving specialized purposes. It is hoped that in a few years' time there will be an international psychiatric classification which will enable psychiatrists to communicate with each other better than they can to-day.
DIscussIoN
Miss Eileen Brooke (London): It was with considerable rejoicing that we at the General Register Office learned that Professor Stengel was making a survey of Classifications of Mental Disease. For ten years we have been struggling to make the International Classification work on diagnoses assigned to patients admitted to Mental Hospitals, and in other morbidity work.
Statistical comparisons within and between countries, which have been very helpful in the study of other diseases, might help also in the study of mental disorder. But for this --it is essential either that everyone should be calling the same thing by the same name, or, if different diagnostic terms are used, there should be exact correspondence between them. There are two places where differences may arise: in the diagnosis, or in the coding done in the statistical office.
To test the efficiency of the coding an exercise was begun between Canada, England and the U.S.A. From the routine data, each country would select 200 consecutive but different diagnoses, and code them by the I.C.D., the A.P.A. classification and the Canadian abbreviation of the I.C.D. The results would then be collated, and show how much variation could be attributed to coding. It was also proposed to see if terms not covered by the classification in use in one's own country could be coded by a different classification. We carried out our part and the U.S.A. have now begun work on our list. In their hospitals all diagnoses not in the A.P.A. are referred back to the psychiatrist. However, the A.P.A. classification gives corresponding code equivalents in the I.C.D. We coded the 200 diagnoses first by the I.C.D., then independently by the A.P.A., and used the A.P.A. 6 equivalents to -translate back to the I.C.D. In theory we should then have arrived back where we started. In practice, we got agreement in 84 out of 205; just over 40%. Counting only 3digit categories for schizophrenia and manicdepressive reaction increased the agreement from 40 to 47%. We next took the three subdivisions of Section V of the I.C.D.: psychoses, psychoneuroses and disorders of behaviour, character and intelligence. Of 107 originally in the psychoses group, 77 (72%) returned there after their journey through the A.P.A. Of 39 psychoneuroses, 23 returned to the same group, 59%, and of 30 in the B.C.I. group, 26 returned to the same group, 87%. This suggests that whether the I.C.D. or the A.P.A. is used, classification into these three main categories is not completely haphazard. Were it not for considerable confounding between 301, manic-depressive reaction and 314, reactive depression, agreement would be more substantial.
A cohort study of what happens to a patient in the two calendar years following his date of first admission has shown two things of particular interest in relation to diagnoses. The curves for the percentage remaining alive and in hospital at three-monthly periods for schizophrenia and manic-depressive reaction behave in different ways, but for each disorder the curves for single and ever-married males and females behave in the same way. Thq same is true for the total percentage time in hospital irrespective of the number of visits. This supports the contention that, on the whole, two different types of illness are being recognized and diagnosed.
In the second half of 1955, 293 patients were admitted who each had 4 hospital admissions in the two years (Table I) . Each patient could enter up to 4 different hospitals and was diag- 3 digits only for schizophrenia and manic-depressive reaction nosed 4 times. The period of two years might be expected to set some limit to the number of separate mental diseases from which the patient could suffer.
Using 4-digit categories where they occur, only 25 % of those entering the same hospital retained the same diagnosis throughout; 43 % of all patients received two diagnoses. Using 3-digit categories for schizophrenia and manic-depressive reaction, 41 % entering the same hospital at each visit had the same diagnosis. The number with 4 different diagnoses was reduced from 20 to 9.
When we take the three broad groups of Section V, we find that, despite variations, 59% remained in the psychotic group throughout. There were 48 patients consistently labelled manic depressives, and 39 schizophrenics, compared with 16 who alternated between these diagnoses. Only 5 patients out of 293 had diagnoses from all three groups.
We intend to continue these studies to see, for example, how far the first diagnosis is confirmed by subsequent ones, and, as we push the survey period on to five, instead of two years, whether the variation increases or whether the diagnosis becomes stabilized. We are also anxious to see whether certain combinations of diagnoses recur, and if so, whether they are meaningful to the psychiatrist.
Dr. Frank Fish (Edinburgh): Psychiatry to-day is roughly in the same position as general medicine was in the middle of the eighteenth century. The nosological differences in general medicine were not solved by arguments but by scientific investigations. The correlation of clinical findings with morbid anatomy was initiated by Morgagni in 1781. Psychiatry still awaits its neurophysiological Morgagni.
A false contrast between psychodynamics and diagnosis is often made. This may be regarded as an expression of the antithesis between the individual as a unique person and as a member of a group. Thus Kierkegaard (1938) , the manicdepressive founder of Existentialism, stressed the uniqueness of the individual and opposed the scientific study of the mind.
The contrast between psychodynamics and diagnosis can be understood from another point of view. The psychodynamic psychotherapist finds that the diagnostic categories do not express the richness of morbid psychological events. The clinical psychiatrist is contemptuous of his psychotherapeutic colleague's neglect of basic common features of psychiatric syndromes. There is no real contrast between psychodynamics and diagnosis since both are necessary for the adequate handling of our patients. Often psychodynamic formulations are merely old diagnostic categories expressed in a new jargon. Freudian psychodynamic formulations have recently been restated in Heidegger's terminology (Binswanger, 1953 (Binswanger, , 1956 .
Despite criticisms of the unscientific nature of psychiatric classifications we still need such classifications as a framework for clinical work and for further investigation. The temporary nature of the framework must never be overlooked.
My own interest in classification began with an interest in the clinical features of chronic schizophrenia. Kleist (1943 Kleist ( , 1949 Fish, 1957a) and Leonhard (1936 Leonhard ( , 1957 Fish, 1958b) had described the clinical features of chronic schizophrenia in great detail and had classified the clinical pictures in a very exhaustive way. I found (Fish, 1957b (Fish, , 1958a ) that both these schemes were useful but that of Leonhard (1957) was more precise and easier to use. In the course of my work I found that the use of the ideas of Kleist and Leonhard increased my knowledge and understanding of chronic schizophrenics. I found, like these workers, that certain symptoms and signs are repeatedly found in any large group of schizophrenics. The presence of these symptoms in chronic schizophrenics in Britain, France, Germany and Norway raises the question why such symptoms repeatedly occur independently of the culture as almost automatic phenomena. A neurophysiological, pharmacological and psychological investigation of these symptoms is needed. Astrup (1957 Astrup ( , 1960 has, in fact, shown that results of certain physiological tests differ in different Leonhard subgroups of schizophrenia.
Leonhard's scheme is very useful in any investigation of chronic schizophrenics because it ensures careful examination and puts the results of such examination in a readily communicable form. Nevertheless despite its usefulness it could not be recommended as a part of a new international classification. These detailed special classifications have a part to play in research but when a new international classification is established we must all be prepared to use it as well as our favourite private classification so that a reasonable amount of information will be avail-able to any worker acquainted with the international classification.
An agreed international classification will make interchange of results of investigations much easier and will bring about a badly needed interchange of ideas between different national schools. An international classification will need an explanatory manual similar to the "Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders" (1952) published by the A.P.A. Such a manual will define the various disease entities and correlate them with diagnostic categories used in other classifications. Perhaps this diagnostic manual could be supplemented by reviews of the teachings of different schools of psychiatry in certain selected special fields in psychiatry where there is much disagreement. It is, I am afraid, too much to hope that this interchange and clarification of views might finally lead to an International Handbook of Psychiatry.
I have been obliged to use the present International Classification of Diseases in psychiatry since 1952 and I have never found it to be satisfactory. The lack of adequate definition of the diagnostic categories is infuriating. The failure of this classification should not, however, be taken as a proof of the uselessness of all classification. I am sure that a much more flexible and workable classification can be agreed on internationally.
Finally I would like to point out that we are faced with a paradoxical situation. An adequate psychiatric classification can only be based on etiology but we can only acquire knowledge of the oetiology of psychiatric disorders by using a classification not based on aetiology. No wonder Jaspers (1946) has said "All schemes of diagnosis must remain a torment for the investigator!"
